Abstract
Introduction
Market economies are praised for creating macro-economic growth but blamed for economic disparities among individuals they generate. Economic inequality is often measured using annual income. However, market economies also generate substantial mobility in earnings over a working lifetime. As a result, annual earnings inequality might substantially exaggerate the extent of true economic disparity among individuals. To the extent that individuals can smooth changes in earnings using savings and credit markets, inequality based on longer periods than a year is a better measure of economic disparity. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of disparity requires studying both inequality and mobility.
A large body of academic work has indeed analyzed earnings inequality and mobility in the United States. A number of key facts from the pre-World War II years to the present have been established using four main data sources: 1 (1) Decennial Census data show that earnings inequality decreased substantially during the "Great Compression" from 1939 to 1949 (Goldin and Margo, 1992 and remained low over the next two decades, (2) the annual Current Population Surveys (CPS) show that earnings inequality has increased substantially since the 1970s and especially during the 1980s (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Katz and Autor, 1999) , (3) income tax statistics show that the top of the annual earnings distribution experienced enormous gains over the last 25 years (Piketty and Saez, 2003) , (4) panel survey data (primarily the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics) show that short-term rank-based mobility has remained fairly stable (Gottschalk, 1997) since the 1970s, (5) the gender gap has narrowed substantially since the 1970s (Goldin, 1990; Blau, 1998; Goldin, 2006) . There are, however, important questions that remain open due primarily to lack of homogenous and longitudinal earnings data covering a long period of time.
First, no annual earnings survey data covering most of the US workforce are available before the 1960s so that it is difficult to measure overall earnings inequality on a consistent basis before the 1960s, and in particular analyze the exact timing of the Great Compression. Second, studies of mobility have focused primarily on short term mobility measures due to lack of long and large longitudinal data. Therefore, little is known about earnings mobility across an entire working life, let alone how such long term mobility has evolved over time. Third and related, there is a controversial debate on whether the increase in inequality since the 1970s has been offset by increases in earnings mobility, and whether consumption inequality has increased to the same extent as income inequality. 2 In particular, the development of performance pay such as bonuses and stock-options for highly compensated employees might have increased substantially variability at the top of earnings distribution so that the trends documented in (Piketty and Saez, 2003) could be misleading.
The goal of this paper is to use the large Social Security Administration (SSA) micro data available since 1937 to make progress on those questions. The SSA data we use combine four key advantages relative to the data that have been used in previous studies on inequality and mobility in the United States. First, the SSA data we use for our research purposes are very large: a 1% sample of the full US covered workforce is available since 1957, and a 0.1% sample since 1937. Second, the SSA data are annual and cover a very long time period of almost 70 years. Third, the SSA data are longitudinal balanced panels as samples are selected based on the same Social Security Number endings every year. Finally, the earnings data have very little measurement error and are fully uncapped (with no top code) since 1978.
Although Social Security earnings data have been used in a number of previous studies (often matched to survey data such as the Current Population Survey), the data we have assembled for this study overcome three important previous limitations. First, from 1951 First, from to 1977 quarterly earnings information to extrapolate earnings up to 4 times the Social Security annual cap. 3 Coarser quarterly earnings information from 1946 to 1950, and the fact that top code censoring was above the top quintile from 1937 to 1945 allows us to study earnings up to the top quintile over the full period. Second, we can match the data to employers and industry information starting in 1957 allowing us to control for expansions in Social Security coverage which started in the 1950s. Finally, to our knowledge, the Social Security annual earnings data before 1951 have not been used outside SSA for research purposes since Robert Solow unpublished Ph.D. thesis in 1951 (Solow, 1951) .
Few socio-demographic variables are available in the SSA data relative to standard survey data. Date of birth, gender, place of birth (including a foreign country birth place), and race are available since 1937. Employer information (including geographic location, industry, and size) is available since 1957. Because we do not have information on important variables such as family structure, education, and hours of work, our analysis will focus only on earnings rather than wage rates and will not attempt to explain the links between family structure, education, labor supply and earnings, as many previous studies have done. In contrast to studies relying on income tax returns, the whole analysis is also based on individual rather than family-level data. Furthermore, we focus only on employment earnings and hence exclude self-employment earnings as well as all other forms of income such as capital income, business income, and transfers. We further restrict our analysis to employment earnings from commerce and industry workers which represents about 70% of all US employees as this is the core group always covered by Social Security since 1937. This is an important limitation when analyzing mobility as individuals may move in and out of the commerce and industry sector. 4 Our analysis allows us to uncover three main findings. First, our annual series confirm the U-shape pattern of earnings inequality since the 1930s. Inequality decreases sharply up to 1953 and increases steadily and continuously afterwards. The U-shape pattern of inequality is also present within each gender group and is more pronounced for men. Percentile ratio series show that (1) the compression in the upper part of the distribution took place from 1942 to 1950 and was followed a steady and continuous widening ever since the early 1950s, (2) the compression in the lower part of the distribution took place primarily in the post war period from 1946 to the last 1960s and unravelled quickly from 1970 to 1983, especially for men, and has been fairly stable over the last two decades.
Second, we find that short-term mobility measures such as rank correlation measures, Shorrock indices comparing annual vs. multi-year earnings inequality has been quite stable over the full period except for a temporary surge during World War II. 5, 6 In particular, the short-term mo-4 Since in recent decades Social Security covers over 95% of earnings, we show in appendix (XX) that our findings for recent decades are robust to including all covered workers. However, we cannot perform such a robustness check for earlier periods when coverage was much less complete.
5 Such a surge is not surprising in light of the large turnover in the labor market generated by the War. 6 An earlier version of this paper (Kopczuk et al., 2007) shows that particular elements of rank transition 3 bility has been remarkably stable since the 1950s, for a variety of mobility measures and also when restricting the sample to men only. Therefore, the evolution over time of annual earnings inequality is very close to the evolution of inequality of longer term earnings. Furthermore, mobility at the top of the earnings distribution, measured by the probability of staying in the top 0.1% after 1, 3, or 5 years has also been very stable since 1978 (the first year in our data with no top code). Therefore, in contrast to the stock-option scenario mentioned above, the SSA data show very clearly that mobility has not mitigated the dramatic increase in annual earnings concentration.
Third, we find that long term mobility measures among all workers, such as the earnings rank correlations from the early part of a working life to the late part of a working life display significant increases since 1951 either when measured unconditionally or when measured within cohorts. However, those increases mask substantial heterogeneity across demographic groups.
Among men, we find stability of long-term mobility over most of the period with a slight decrease in recent decades. The decrease of the gender gap in earnings, which started in the late 1960s, has taken place throughout the distribution, including the very top, and has contributed greatly to reducing long-term inequality and increasing long-term mobility across all workers. In particular, upward mobility over a career was much lower for women than for men but this mobility gap has also been reduced significantly in recent decades. Economic progress of women is therefore the driving force behind the increase in overall long-term mobility measures which mask stability or even slight declines in long-term mobility among men.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework linking inequality and mobility measures, the data, and our estimation methods. Section 3 presents inequality results based on annual earnings. Section 4 focuses on short-term mobility and its effects on inequality while Section 5 focuses on long-term career mobility and inequality. Finally, Section 6offers some concluding remarks. The complete details on the data and our methodology, as well as sensitivity analysis are presented in an electronic appendix. Complete tabulated results in electronic format are posted online.
matrices have been stable as well.
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2 Framework, Data, and Methodology
Conceptual Framework
Our main goal is to document the evolution of earnings inequality. Inequality can be measured over short-term (such as annual earnings) or over long-term (such as earnings averaged over several years or even a lifetime). With mobility in earnings, long-term inequality will be lower than short-term inequality as moving up and down the distribution of short-term earnings will make the distribution of long-term earnings more equal. Therefore, conceptually, a way to measure mobility (Shorrocks, 1978) is to compare inequality of short-term earnings to inequality of long-term earnings and define mobility as:
(1) Long-term earnings inequality = Short-term earning inequality * (1 -Mobility)
Alternatively, one can define mobility directly as changes or "shocks" in earnings. In our framework, such shocks are defined broadly as any deviation from long-term earnings. Those shocks could be indeed real shocks such as unemployment, disability, or an unexpected promotion. Changes could also be the consequence of voluntary choices in response to other economic shocks (such as changes in family structure, health, future job prospects etc.) such as reducing (or increasing) hours of work, voluntarily changing jobs, or obtaining an expected pay raise.
Such shocks can be transitory (such as working overtime in response to a temporarily increased demand for employer's product or a short unemployment spell in the construction industry) or permanent (being laid off from a job in a declining industry). In that framework, both long-term inequality and the extent of shocks contribute to shaping short-term inequality:
(2) Short-term earnings inequality = Long-term earnings inequality + Variability in earnings
(1) and (2) are related by the formula:
(3) Variability in earnings = Short-term earnings inequality * Mobility = Long-term earnings inequality * Mobility / (1-Mobility)
Thus, equation (3) shows that a change in mobility with no change in long-term inequality is due to an increase in variability in earnings. Conversely, an increase in inequality with no change in mobility implies an increased variability in earnings.
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In order to derive those formulas formally, we consider a situation where a fixed group of individuals i = 1, .., I have short-term earnings z it > 0 in each period t = 1, .., K. For example t can represent a year. We can define long-term earnings for individual i as the average across all K periods:z i = t z it /K. We normalize earnings so that average earnings (across individuals)
are the same in each period. 7
From a vector of individual earnings z = (z 1 , .., z I ), an inequality index can be defined as
, where G(.) is convex in z. We also assume that G(.) is homogeneous of degree zero (multiplying all earnings by a given factor does not change inequality). For example, G(.) can be the Gini index or the variance of log earnings. Shorrocks (1978) shows that (Theorem 1a, p.
XX):
where z t is the vector of earnings in period t andz the vector of average (across periods)
earnings. This inequality captures the idea that movements in individual earnings up and down the distribution reduces long-term inequality (relative to short-term inequality). Hence we can define a related Shorrock mobility index 0 ≤ M ≤ 1 as:
which is a formalization of equation (1) above.
It is also possible to define direct mobility indices such as the rank correlation in earnings from year t to year t + p (or quintile mobility matrices from year t to year t + p). Such mobility indices are likely to be closely related to the Shorrock indices as re-ranking from one period to
another is precisely what creates a wedge between long-term inequality and (the average of)
short-term inequality. The advantage of direct mobility indices is that they are more concrete and transparent than Shorrock indices. In our paper, we will therefore use both and show that they evolve very similarly overtime.
Alternatively, introducing y it = log z it andȳ i = t log z it /K, we can define deviations in (log) earnings as:
In our empirical analysis, earnings will be indexed to the nominal average earnings index.
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It is important to note that ε it incorporates both transitory earnings shocks (such as an iid process) and permanent earnings shocks (such as a Brownian motion). The deviation ε it could either be uncertain ex-ante from the individual perspective, or predictable. 8
The Shorrocks theorem applied to the inequality index variance of log-earnings implies that
where the variance var it (y it ) is taken over both i = 1, .., I and K = 1, .., t. If, for illustration, we make the statistical assumption that ε it ⊥ȳ i and var(ε it ) = σ 2 ε , then we have:
which is a formalization of equation (2) above. The Shorrocks inequality index in that case is
This shows that short-term earnings variance can increase because of an increase in longterm earnings variance or an increase in the variance of earnings deviations. Alternatively and equivalently, short-term inequality can increase while long-term inequality is stable if mobility increases. This simple framework can help us reconcile the findings from the previous literature on earnings mobility in the United States. Rank based mobility measures (such as year-to-year rank correlation or quintile mobility matrices) are stable over time (XX cite) while there has been an increase in both the variance of transitory earnings (XX cite). Obviously, such findings can be reconciled if the disparity in permanent earnings has widened while rank-based mobility of earnings are remained stable so that earnings changes are larger on average in levels.
The theoretical framework we just described critically assumed that we consider the same set of individuals across the K short-term periods. In practice, because individuals leave or enter the labor force (or the "commerce and industry" sector we will be focusing on), the set of individuals with positive earnings varies across periods. As the number of periods K becomes large, the sample will become smaller. Therefore, we will only consider relatively small values earnings from 1978 on) include full wage income compensation including all salaries, bonuses, and exercised stock-options exactly as wage income reported on individual income tax returns.
(2) The second file is known as the Employee-Employer file (EE-ER) and we will rely on its 9 Detailed documentation of these datasets can be found in Panis et al. (2000) [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] or four times the top code . The Pareto distribution is calibrated from wage income tax statistics published by the Internal Revenue
Service to match the top wage income shares series estimated in Piketty and Saez (2003) . From 1951 to 1977, we use earnings for quarters when they are observed to impute earnings in quarters that are not observed (when the taxable ceiling is reached after the first quarter). This method is discussed in more detail in Kestenbaum (1976, his method II). 11
The number of individuals who were top-coded in the first quarter and whose earnings are imputed based on the Pareto imputation is less than 1% of the sample for virtually all years after 1951. Consequently, high-quality earnings information is available for the bottom 99% of the sample allowing us to study both inequality and mobility up to the top percentile. In order to assess the sensitivity of our mobility and multi-year inequality estimates with respect to top code imputation, we use two Pareto imputation methods (see appendix). In the first or main method, the Pareto imputation is based on draws from a uniform distribution that are independent across individuals but also time periods. This generates an upper bound on mobility within top coded individuals. The alternative method, the uniform distribution draw is independent across individuals but fixed over time for a given individual. This generates a lower bound on mobility. We always test that the two methods generate virtually the same series (see appendix XX for examples). It is not too surprising because, starting with 1951, imputations matter for just the top 1% of the sample and mobility measures for the full population are not very sensitive to what happens within the very top group.
• Changing Coverage Issues
Initially, Social Security covered only "commerce and industry" employees defined as most private for-profit sector employees and excluding farm and domestic employees as well as self- and industry earnings is a limitation for our study, especially for the analysis of mobility (as workers may move in and out of the commerce and industry sector over a career). We show in appendix XX that our series for recent decades are robust to including all covered workers.
However, we cannot test whether our series would also be robust to that extension in the early decades of the period we are considering.
• Sample Selection
For our primary analysis, we are restricting the sample to adult individuals aged 25 and above (by January 1st of the corresponding year) up to age 60 (by January 1st of the corresponding year). This top age restriction allows us to concentrate on the working-age population.. 12
Second, we consider for our main sample only workers with annual (commerce and industry) employment earnings above a minimum threshold defined as one-fourth of a full year-full time which is consistent with the CPS evidence extensively discussed in Katz and Autor (1999) . On the other hand, stability of the Gini coefficients for men and for women from the 1950s through the late 1960s highlights that the overall increase in the Gini coefficient in that period has been driven by a widening of the gender gap in earnings (i.e., the between rather than within group component). Strikingly, there is more earnings inequality among women than among men in the 1950s and 1960s while the reverse is true before the Great compression and since the late 1970s.
a full year-full time minimum wage.
Finally, the increase in the Gini coefficient has slowed since the late 1980s in the overall sample. It is interesting to note that a large part of the 3.5 points increase in the Gini from 1990
to 2004 is due to a surge in earnings within the top percentile of the distribution. The series of Gini coefficients estimated excluding the top 1% increases by less than 2 points since 1990 (see appendix XX). 14 It should also be noted that, since the late 1980s, the Gini coefficient has increased faster for men and women separately than for all workers. This has been driven by an increase in the earnings of women relative to men, especially at the top of the distribution as we shall see.
Most previous work has focused on gender specific measures of inequality. As men and women share a single labor market, it is also valuable to analyze the overall inequality generated in the labor market (in the "commerce and industry" sector in our analysis). Our analysis for all workers and by gender provides clear evidence of the importance of changes in women's labor market behavior and outcomes for understanding overall changes in inequality, a topic we will return to.
In order to understand where in the distribution the changes in inequality displayed on P50/P20 displays a fairly different time pattern than P80/P50. First, the compression 14 This shows that results based on survey data such as official Census Bureau inequality statistics which do not measure well the top 1% can give an incomplete view of inequality changes even when using global indices such as the Gini. 15 We choose P80 (instead of the more usual P90) in order to avoid top coding issues before 1951 and P20
(instead of the more usual P10) so that our low percentile estimate is not too closely driven by the average wage indexed and very low minimum we have chosen ($2575 in 2004) .
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happens primarily in the post war period from 1946 to 1953. There are large swings in P50/P20 during the war, especially for men, as many young low income earners leave and enter the labor force because of the war, but P50/P20 is virtually the same in 1941 and 1946 or 1947. 16 After the Great Compression, P50/P20 for all workers remains fairly stable to the present alternating periods of increase and decrease. In particular, it decreases smoothly from the mid-1980s to 2000 implying that inequality in the bottom half shrunk in the last two decades although it started increasing after 2000. The pattern for men only is quite different and displays an overall U-shape with a sharper great compression which extends well into the post-war period with an absolute minimum in 1969 followed by a sharp increase up to 1983 and relative stability since then. women (Panel C) with various inequality measures for selective years (1937-1939, 1960, 1980, and 2004 ).
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The Effects of Short Term Mobility on Earnings Inequality
In this section, we use our theoretical framework from Section 2.1 to analyze multi-year inequality and relate it to annual earnings inequality analyzed in Section 3. In the theoretical framework, we will consider each period to be a year and the longer period will be 5 years (K = 5). 17
We will compare inequality based on annual earnings and earnings averaged over 5 years. We will then derive the implied Shorrocks mobility index, and decompose annual inequality into multi-year inequality and the variability in earnings. We will also examine some direct measures of mobility such as rank correlations.
Figures 3 plots the Gini coefficient series for earnings averaged over 5 years 18 and annual 16 In the working paper version (Kopczuk et al., 2007) we show that compositional changes during the war are strongly influencing the bottom of the distribution during the early 1940s and find some suggestive evidence that the "Great Compression" at the bottom of the distribution may have taken place in the early 1940s as well. 17 Computing series based on 3 year averages instead of 5 year generates very similar patterns. Increasing K beyond 5 would reduce substantially sample size as we require earnings to be above the minimum in each of the 5 years as described below. 18 The average is taken after indexing annual earnings by the average wage index.
14 earnings. For a given year t, the sample for both the five year Gini and the annual Gini is defined as all individuals with "Commerce and Industry" earnings above the minimum threshold in all 5 years, t − 2, t − 1, t, t + 1, t + 2 (and aged 25 to 60 in the middle year t). We show the average of the five annual Gini coefficients between t − 2 and t + 2 as our measure of annual Gini coefficient, because it matches the Shorrocks' approach. Because the sample is the same for both series, Shorrocks' theorem implies that the five year Gini is always smaller than the average of the annual Gini (over the corresponding 5 years) as indeed displayed on the Figure. We also display the same series for men only (in lighter grey). 19 The annual Gini displays the same overall pattern as in Figure 1 measure is the straight rank correlation in earnings between year t and year t + 1 (in the sample of individuals present in our core sample in both years t and t + 1). Rank mobility follows the same overall pattern as the Shorrock mobility index: a temporary dip during the war followed
19 Alternatively, we could have defined the sample as all individuals with earnings above the minimum threshold in any of the 5 years, t − 2, t − 1, t, t + 1, t + 2. Those series follow the same pattern and are presented in appendix XX. We prefer to use the positive earnings in all 5 years criterion because this is a necessity when analyzing variability in log-earnings.
a slight increase. Over the last two decades, the rank correlation in year-to-year earnings has been very stable and very high around 0.9. Figure 5 displays the average of variance of annual log earnings over t − 2 to t + 2 (defined on the stable sample as before), the variance of five year average log-earnings, var t+2 s=t−2 log z is 5 , and the variance of log earnings deviations estimated as
where the variance is taken across all individuals i with earnings above the minimum threshold in all 5 years t − 2, .., t + 2. As the previous two mobility measures, those series, displayed in black for all workers and in grey for men only, show a temporary surge in the variance of transitory earnings during the war, followed by a fairly stable pattern after 1960. In particular,
it is striking that we do not observe an increased earnings variability over the last 20 years so that all the increase in the log-earnings variance can be attributed to the increase in the variance of permanent (five year average) log-earnings. Our results stand in some contrast to Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) using PSID data found that over one third of increase in the variance of log-earnings from the 1970s to the 1980s was due to an increase in transitory earnings (Table 1, The absence of top code since 1978 allows us to zoom on top earnings which, as we showed in Table 1 , have surged in recent decades. Figure 6A is not due to increased mobility at the top. This finding is confirmed in Figure 6B which shows the probability of staying in the top 1% earnings group after 1, 3, 5 and 10 years (conditional on staying in our core sample) starting in 1978. The one-year probability is between 60% and 70% and it shows no overall trend. Therefore, our analysis shows that the dramatic surge in top earnings has not been accompanied by a similar surge in mobility in and out top earnings groups. Hence, annual earnings concentration measures provide a very good approximation to longer-term earnings concentration measures. 23 Table 2 summarizes the key short-term mobility trends for all (Panel A) and men (Panel B)
with various mobility measures for selective years (1939, 1960, 1980, and 2002) .
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In sum, the movements in short-term mobility series appear to be much smaller than changes in inequality over time. of Piketty and Saez (2003) show that changes in assortative mating played at best a minor role in the surge of family employment earnings at the top of the earnings distribution. 22 In order to follow the framework from Section 2.1 (applied in this case to the top 1% earnings share measure of inequality), we have computed such shares (in year t) on the sample of all individuals with minimum earnings in all 5 years, t − 2, .., t + 2. 23 In particular, the development of bonuses and stock-options (whose exercise profits are included in our earnings measure) paid to highly compensated employees does not seem to have increased dramatically mobility. 24 The CBO study focuses on probabilities of large earnings increases (or drops) instead of quantile mobility as we do here.
who decompose transitory and permanent variance in log-earnings using PSID data and show an increase in both components. Our decomposition using SSA data shows that only permanent earnings variance has increased in recent decades.
Long-term mobility and Life-Time Inequality
The very long span of our data allows us to estimate long-term mobility. Such mobility measures go beyond the issue of transitory earnings analyzed above and describe instead mobility across a full working life. Such estimates have not yet been produced for the United States in any systematic way because of the lack of very long and large panels.
Unconditional Long-Term Inequality and Mobility
We begin with the simplest extension of our previous analysis to a longer-term horizon. In the context of the theoretical framework from Section 2.1, we now assume that a period is 11 consecutive years. We define the "core long-term sample" in year t as all individuals aged 25-60 in year t with average earnings (using the standard wage indexation) from year t − 5 to year t + 5 above the minimum threshold. Hence, our sample includes individuals with zeros in some years as long as average earnings are above the threshold. 25 Figure 7 displays the Gini coefficients for all workers, and men and women separately based on those 11 year average earnings from 1942 to 1999. The overall picture is actually strikingly similar to our annual Figure 1 . The Gini coefficient series for all workers displays on overall U-shape with a Great compression from 1942 to 1953, an absolute minimum in 1953, followed by a steady increase which accelerates in the 1970s and 1980s and slows down in the 1990s. The U-shape pattern is also much more pronounced for men than for women and shows that, for men, the inequality increase was concentrated in the 1970s and 1980s. 26
After exploring base inequality over those 11 year spells, we turn to long-term mobility. Figure 8 displays the rank correlation between 11 year earnings spell centered in year t and 11 year earnings spell after T years (i.e., centered in year t + T respectively) in the same sample of individuals present in the "long-term core sample" in both year t and year t + T . The figure presents such correlations for three choices of T : 10 years, 15 years, and 20 years. Given our 25-60 age restriction (which applies in both year t and t + T ), for T = 20, in sample in year t is aged 25 to 40 (and the sample in year t + 20 is aged 45 to 60). Thus, this measure captures mobility from early career to late career. The figure also displays the same series for men only in lighter grey. Three points are worth noting.
First, the correlation is unsurprisingly lower as T increases but it is striking to note that even after 20 years, the correlation is still substantial (in the vicinity of 0.5). Second, the series for all workers show that rank correlation has actually significantly decreased over time:
from example the rank correlation between 1950s and 1970s earnings was around 0.57 but it is only 0.49 between 1970s and 1990s earnings. This shows that long-term mobility has increased significantly over the last five decades. This result stands in contrast to our short-term mobility results displaying substantial stability. Third however, Figure 8 shows that this increase in longterm mobility disappears in the sample of men. The series for men displays a slight decrease in rank correlation in the first part of the period followed by an increase in the last part of the period. On net, the series for men display a slight overall increase in rank correlation and hence a slight decrease in long-term mobility over the full period.
Cohort based Long-Term Inequality and Mobility
The analysis so far ignored changes in the age structure of the population as well as changes in the wage profiles over a career. In order to control for those effects, we turn to cohort-level For a given year of birth cohort, we define the "core early career sample" as all individuals with average "commerce and industry" earnings (using again the standard wage indexation) above the minimum threshold in the early career.
We define similarly the "core mid career" and "core late career" are defined similarly for each birth cohort. The earnings in early, mid, or late career are defined as average "commerce and industry" earnings during the corresponding stage (always using the average wage index). Figure 9 reports the Gini coefficient series by year of birth for early, mid, and late career.
The Gini coefficients for men only are also displayed in lighter grey. The cohort based Gini coefficients are consistent with our previous findings and display a U-shape over the full period.
Two points are worth noting. First, there is much more inequality in late career than in middle career, and in middle career than in early career showing that long-term inequality fans out over the course of a working life. Second, the Gini series show that long-term inequality has been stable for the baby-boom cohorts born after 1945 in the sample of all workers. Those results are striking in light of our previous results showing a worsening of inequality in annual cross-sections and for multi-year averages. Third, however, the Gini series for men only show that inequality has increased substantially across baby-boom cohorts. This sharp contrast between series for all workers versus men only reinforces our previous findings that gender effects play an important role in shaping the trends in overall inequality. Figure 10 reports the rank correlation between (1) early career earnings and middle career earnings, (2) middle career earnings and late career earnings, (3) early career earnings and late career earnings. It also displays the same series for men only in lighter grey. Two important results should be noted. First, as we found in the unconditional mobility series, mobility over a career is fairly modest with a correlation over 0.5 from early to late career. Second, the pattern of mobility over the period displays modest increases in mobility over the period we analyze. Those changes are most visible in decreases in rank correlation from early to late career. However, those results of increasing mobility disappear in the sample for men only suggesting again that they are driven by gender effects, to which we now turn.
The Role of Gender Gaps in Long-Term Inequality and Mobility
As we saw, there are striking differences in the long-term inequality and mobility series for all workers vs. for men only: Long-term inequality has increased much less in the sample of all workers than in the sample of men only. Long-term mobility has increased over the last 4 decades in the sample of all workers but not in the sample of men only. Such differences can be explained by the reduction in the gender gap that has taken place over the period. Figure 12 displays the upward mobility (defined as the probability of moving from the bottom two quintile groups to the top quintile group) after 20 years for all workers, men only, and women 27 As a result, they combine not only the traditional wage gap among workers but also the labor force participation gap (including the decision to work in the commerce and industry sector rather than other sectors or self-employment).
28 This is consistent with the analysis of Goldin (1991) 21 only. The figure shows a striking heterogeneity across groups. First, men have significantly higher levels of upward mobility than overall workers while women have significantly lower levels of upward mobility than overall workers. Thus, in addition to the annual earnings gap we documented, there is an upward mobility gap as well across groups. Second, the mobility gap has also been closing overtime: the probability of upward mobility among men has been stable overall since World War II with a slight increase up to the 1960s and declines after the 1970s. In contrast, the probability of upward mobility of women has continuously increased from a very low level of less than 1% in the 1950s to about 7% in the 1980s. The increase in upward mobility for women compensate for the stagnation or slight decline in mobility for men so that the overall upward mobility for all workers is slightly increasing. 30 Figure 12 also suggests that the gains in annual earnings made by women documented earlier were in part due to women already in the labor force making earnings gains rather than gains entirely due to the entry of new cohorts of women with higher earnings.
It is important to emphasize here that including only commerce and industry earnings is a limitation for our study. For example, if women who start their career as teachers are more likely today (relative to decades ago) to shift to a commerce and industry occupation later in their career, then our series will display higher upward mobility in commerce and industry earnings today than decades ago although upward mobility in total earnings (including covered and uncovered occupations) might not have changed. We can show that upward mobility is very similar in the full sample and in the commerce and industry sample in recent decades. This is re-assuring but it does not rule out entirely the possibility that mobility patterns across those two groups were different decades ago. 31
30 It is conceivable that upward mobility is lower for women (or Blacks) because even within P0-40, they are more likely to be in the bottom half of P0-40 than men. Kopczuk et al. (2007) show that controlling for those differences leaves the series virtually unchanged. Therefore, controlling for base earnings does not affect our results. 31 The same critique can be made for movements between employment and self-employment.
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Conclusion
Our paper has used U.S. Social Security earnings administrative data to construct series of inequality and mobility in the United States since 1937. The analysis of these data has allowed us to start exploring the evolution of mobility and inequality over a full career as well as complement the more standard analysis of annual inequality and short term mobility in several ways.
We found that changes in short-term mobility have not substantially affected the evolution of inequality, so that annual snapshots of the distribution provide a good approximation of the evolution of the longer term measures of inequality. In particular, we find that increases in annual earnings inequality are driven almost entirely by increases in permanent earnings inequality with much more modest changes in the variability of transitory earnings.
However, our key finding is that while the overall measures of mobility are fairly stable, they hide heterogeneity by gender groups. Inequality and mobility among male workers has worsened along almost any dimension since the 1950s: our series display sharp increases in annual earnings inequality, slight reductions in short-term mobility, large increases in long-term career wide inequality with slight reduction or stability of long-term mobility. Against those developments stand the very large earning gains achieved by women since the 1950s, due to increases in labor force attachment as well as increases in earnings conditional on working.
Those gains have been so great that they compensate for the increase in inequality for males.
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Figures footnotes In year t, the sample for both series is defined as all individuals aged 25 to 60 in year t, with commerce and industry earnings above the minimum threshold in all 5 years t − 2, t − 1, t, t + 1, t + 2. Earnings are averaged over the 5 year span using the average earnings index. The Gini coefficient for annual earnings displayed for year t is the average of the Gini coefficient for annual earnings in years t − 2, .., t + 2.
The same series are reported in lighter grey for the sample restricted to men only. vs. five year average earnings Gini and the rank correlation between earnings in year t and year t + 1. The Shorrock mobility coefficient in year t is defined as the ratio of the 5 year earnings (from t − 2 to t + 2) Gini coefficient to the average of the annual earnings Gini for years t − 2, .., t + 2 (those two series are displayed on Figure 3 ). The rank correlation in year t is estimated on the sample of individuals present in the core sample (commerce and industry employees aged 25 to 60, see Figure 1 footnote) in both year t and year t + 1.
The same series are reported in lighter grey for the sample restricted to men only.
Figure 5: The Figure displays the variance of (log) annual earning, the variance of (log) five year average earnings, and the variance of the difference between (log) annual earnings and (log) five year average earnings. In year t, the sample for all three series is defined as all individuals aged 25 to 60 in year t, with commerce and industry earnings above the minimum threshold in all 5 years t − 2, t − 1, t, t + 1, t + 2. The (log) annual earnings variance is estimated as the average (across years t − 2, .., t + 2) of the variance of (log) annual earnings. The same series are reported in lighter grey for the sample restricted to men only. Figure 6A : The sample in year t is all individuals aged 25 to 60 in year t and commerce and industry earnings above the minimum threshold in all 5 years t − 2, t − 1, t, t + 1, t + 2. In year t, the Figure displays (1) the share of total year t earnings accruing to the top 1% earners in that year, (2) the share to total five year average earnings (from year t−2, ..t+2)
accruing to the top 1% earners (in terms of average 5 year earnings). with average 11 year earnings around years t and t + X above the minimum threshold.
Because of small sample size, series including earnings before 1957 are smoothed using a weighted 3-year moving average with weight of .5 for cohort t and weights of .25 for t − 1 and t + 1. The same series are reported in lighter grey for the sample restricted to men only (in which case, rank is estimated within the sample of men only). The sample is defined as individuals present in the career sample (see Figure 9 ) for both corresponding stages of the career. (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) and Social Security Administration (1967) and reported in lighter grey. The sample is defined as all individuals aged 25 to 60 in year t and t + 20, with average 11 year earnings around years t and t + 20 above the minimum threshold. Because of small sample size, series including earnings before 1957 are smoothed using a weighted 3-year moving average with weight of .5 for cohort t and weights of .25 for t − 1 and t + 1. The series are reported for all workers, men only, and women only. In all three cases, quintile groups are defined based on the sample of all workers.Men Annual (log) earnings 5 year average (log) earnings Transitory earningsAll Workers Men Women
